A Dynamic Game Approach for Demand-Side Management: Scheduling Energy
  Storage with Forecasting Errors by Pilz, Matthias & Al-Fagih, Luluwah
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Scheduling Energy Storage with Forecasting Errors
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Abstract Smart metering infrastructure allows for two-way communication and
power transfer. Based on this promising technology, we propose a demand-side
management (DSM) scheme for a residential neighbourhood of prosumers. Its core
is a discrete time dynamic game to schedule individually owned home energy
storage. The system model includes an advanced battery model, local generation
of renewable energy, and forecasting errors for demand and generation.
We derive a closed-form solution for the best-response problem of a player
and construct an iterative algorithm to solve the game. Empirical analysis shows
exponential convergence towards the Nash equilibrium. A comparison to a DSM
scheme with a static game, reveals the advantages of the dynamic game approach.
We provide an extensive analysis on the influence of the forecasting error on the
outcome of the game. A key result demonstrates that our approach is robust even
in the worst-case scenario. This grants considerable gains for the utility company
organising the DSM scheme and its participants.
Keywords Dynamic Game · Smart Grid · Demand-Side Management · Energy
Storage · Battery Modelling · Uncertainty · Game Theory
1 Introduction
Climate change poses a serious threat to the global ecosystem. To limit the increase
of global average temperatures, it is critical to restrict greenhouse gas emissions.
Currently, burning fossil fuels accounts for the largest share of CO2 emissions by
humans into the atmosphere. Renewable energy sources, such as wind and solar,
have a much smaller carbon footprint and should be employed instead [12]. Due to
the intermittent nature of these sources, their integration into the power system
can be a challenging task. Our research investigates possibilities for more efficient
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and environment friendly access to electricity by means of energy storage and
renewable energy generation.
The concept rests upon the implementation of a technologically advanced
power grid. In contrast to the current power grid, this smart grid features two-way
communication and power transfer between the utility company (UC) and in-
dividual households [4]. Its decentralised nature is expressed through distributed
generation and storage of energy, with individual households capable of doing both.
These households are called prosumers (combination of producer and consumer).
Moreover, the deployment of smart meters allows households to accurately measure
electricity demands in real-time. This permits the implementation of demand-side
management (DSM) schemes. Within such schemes, the UC incentivises users to
avoid consumption during peak hours by means of dynamic pricing tariffs. These
tariffs determine the price per energy unit based on the aggregated load of all
users (cf. [20,6,2]). This will eventually allow them to reduce investments into fast
ramping technologies, needed otherwise.
In [20,2,7,24,5] consumers react to these price incentives by rescheduling their
appliances, thus potentially interfering with their habits. Among them, [20,2,5]
additionally model the usage of energy storage systems. All of these users are
aiming at a reduction of the peak-to-average ratio (PAR) of the aggregated load,
since achieving this eventually translates into financial benefits for the participants.
The methods of choice to obtain the desired schedules are almost always based on
game–theoretic concepts. Only [5] deviates by using convex optimisation. Since the
DSM scheme directly influences the routines of the users, their comfort levels play
an important role. For instance, Yaagoubi et al. [24] found that when acceptable
comfort levels are preserved, the amount of savings from the energy bill reduces
by more than half of the optimum. Note that all these studies have the common
idea of scheduling the usage of appliances and batteries in a day-ahead manner.
Day-ahead scheduling that does not interfere with the users can solely be re-
alised through energy storage systems. [8,13] followed this approach and showed
that considerable gains are achievable without interrupting the habits of the con-
sumers. Nguyen et al. [8] put their focus on developing a distributed algorithm,
while Pilz et al. [13] implemented an advanced battery model, providing insight
into how specific battery characteristics influence the participation behaviour and
thus the outcome of the game.
This work builds on these previous results and extends the approach of [13] in
two directions. Firstly, we introduce a more sophisticated underlying game struc-
ture for the DSM scheme, namely a discrete time dynamic game. Within this
formulation the action space is continuous instead of the discrete options avail-
able in [13]. As a consequence, the outcome for the players improves as they can
make more fine-grained decisions. Another advantage is that this allows for the
derivation of a best response strategy and thus does not require a computationally
expensive search for the best response. Secondly, we analyse the influence of the
forecasting error for demand and energy generation on the scheduling outcome.
In order to assure the stability of the grid, a real-world application requires the
mechanism to be resilient against eventual errors in the predictions, as they will
undoubtedly occur.
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Our contributions are as follows:
(1) We introduce a novel discrete time dynamic game for energy storage
scheduling among prosumers in the smart grid. The closed form solution to
the best-response problem is derived by means of a dynamic-programming
approach. The ensuing iterative algorithm converges quickly towards the
Nash-equilibrium. Direct comparison to similar approaches, i.e. [8,13,24],
reveals the superiority both in terms of achieved PAR reduction and com-
putational costs.
(2) A complete day-ahead DSM scheme, consisting of prosumers with realis-
tically modelled batteries, local renewable energy sources, and forecasting
errors for demand and generation is simulated. In contrast to previous
works which merely simulate individual days, our scheduling period cov-
ers a full year. The length of the simulation allows for an in-depth analysis
of the influence of the forecasting errors as well as the impact of the num-
ber of participants in the DSM scheme.
(3) We show that the proposed dynamic game approach is robust with respect
to the forecasting errors, even in the worst-case scenario. The respective
results exhibit only small deviations in the PAR reduction outcomes com-
pared to runs with accurate predictions, and hardly any influence on the
financial benefits for the DSM participants.
(4) For the first time, a comparison of how different compositions of neigh-
bourhoods perform in the DSM scheme is presented. We find that a com-
munity consisting of a mix of consumer types can achieve best results.
This paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we give an overview of the
system, provide details of the DSM protocol, introduce the battery and the re-
newable energy model, and explain the pricing tariff. Section 3 contains detailed
information about the dynamic game. Furthermore, it includes the derivation of
the best-response solution and the description of the iterative algorithm. The simu-
lation parameters and the data sets for demand and generation data are presented
in the beginning of Section 4. Then, we compare our approach to the static game
approach of [13], show the influence of the forecasting errors, and investigate the
neighbourhood composition. Section 5 concludes the paper and points out future
research directions.
2 System Model - A Smart Grid Neighbourhood
In this section, we build the basis to the formulation of the battery scheduling game
presented in Section 3. We introduce the concept of a smart grid neighbourhood
that participates in a demand-side management (DSM) program to reduce their
electricity bills. Each of the participants is equipped with an individually owned
lithium-ion battery in addition to a photovoltaic (PV) cell which generates elec-
tricity. Models for both the battery and the PV cell are stated in detail. Moreover,
we clarify the specific smart meter infrastructure that is necessary to implement
the DSM program, as well as the role of the single utility company (UC) running
this program.
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Fig. 1 Systematic sketch of the neighbourhood. Solid arrows stand for power flow, while dot-
ted arrows stand for information flow. The top half of the figure represents a participating
household of the DSM scheme. It is equipped with a lithium-ion battery and a solar panel.
The solar panel can directly charge the battery, but to run any appliance its direct current
needs to be converted to alternating current by the inverter. The smart meter collects data and
executes the schedule obtained from the author’s scheduling software selma, which is based on
a dynamic game. A non-participating household is depicted in the bottom left corner. It is also
equipped with a smart meter, collecting data and communicating with the utility company.
The complete neighbourhood consists of a number of households (cf. bottom right) that belong
to either one of the shown categories. All of them are served by the same utility company.
2.1 Neighbourhood and Demand-Side Management Program
Consider a residential neighbourhood comprised of M houses. Each of these is
equipped with a smart meter. Smart meters are capable of measuring electric-
ity consumption accurately and at a higher frequency than the usual monthly or
quarterly readings. Furthermore, these devices can communicate directly with the
utility company. This eventually allows for the implementation of the DSM pro-
gram, and also eliminates the need for on-site readings. For our proposed model,
we assume that we are able to obtain readings in regular intervals. Based on the
reading-frequency, we split each day into T discrete intervals and denote the set
of all intervals by T .
We assume that the M houses are served by the same UC. In order to incen-
tivise consumers to participate in the DSM scheme, the UC offers them a specific
pricing scheme, which eventually reduces their electricity bills. Details can be found
in Section 2.3. Let us denote the set of households who participate in the DSM
program by N ⊂M, where M is the set of all households in the neighbourhood.
The total number of participants is N = |N |. Besides the different pricing scheme,
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the participants of the DSM possess their own battery storage system and have
solar panels installed. An overview of the neighbourhood is given in Figure 1.
The DSM scheme can be seen as a protocol, which is gone through repeatedly.
In our study the protocol is run once per day. Note that this is a completely
automated process run by our scheduling software selma (short for: Scheduler
for Electricity in Local MArkets), which needs to be installed on a consumer
access device given to each participant of the scheme. The algorithm to obtain the
schedules is based on a discrete time dynamic game, which will be introduced in
Section 3.1.
Before the start of each scheduling period, selma forecasts the demand1 of
the respective household for each interval t ∈ T of the upcoming day. This infor-
mation is sent to the UC. The smart meters of non-participants are not able to
forecast their own demand. Thus, the UC performs the forecasting step for these
households, based on historically collected data. Eventually, forecasted demand
curves are aggregated and the information is sent to each DSM participant. Note
that no information about individual neighbours is shared, but only aggregated
information. This provides anonymity to all consumers.
Based on this input, the households play a dynamic non-cooperative game
(cf. Section 3). The outcome of the game is a set of schedules, one for each house-
hold, which specify how they can make best use of their battery system. The
households will follow these schedules throughout the day, even if their actual de-
mand differs from the forecasted one. In Section 4, we investigate the influence of
the forecasting error and show the robustness of the approach even in the worst-
case scenario. At the end of the scheduling period, the electricity costs for each
consumer is calculated based on the agreed pricing terms and the protocol starts
over again.
2.2 Individual Households
Households that participate in the DSM scheme are equipped with a lithium-ion
battery and PV cells. In this subsection, we introduce the battery model and clarify
how the battery can be used. Moreover, details on the PV system are provided.
Finally, we clarify the terminology of demand, net-demand and load of a household
based on the usage of their battery and PV cells.
2.2.1 Battery Model and Decision Variables
In this paper, we employ the same battery model as used in [13]. This includes
charging, discharging, and self-discharging characteristics of a lithium-ion battery.
In fact, the same model may also be applied for lead–acid battery systems (but
not nickel–based batteries due to their different charging behaviour). As all our
simulations are based on a real-world lithium-ion battery system, in the following
we will only refer to them as such.
1 As of today, the forecasting module is not included into selma. For this study we assume
this information to be given and refer the reader to [1,3] for details on demand forecasting.
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Fig. 2 Schematic illustration of the charging and discharging behaviour of a lithium-ion bat-
tery. The graph on the left (right) shows the characteristic charging (discharging) curve. Given
a certain state of charge s′, the grey area stands for the achievable state of charge within the
following interval. The right axes represent the possible decisions when charging (discharg-
ing), where H+ (s′) (H− (s′)) summarise the decision intervals. The discrepancy between the
achievable state of charge and the decision interval are due to losses, i.e. imperfect efficiencies
while charging (discharging).
Charging: Lithium-ion batteries are charged in a two–stage process [18]. In the
first stage, the state-of-charge (SOC) increases linearly. This stage is called the
‘constant current’ (CC) stage, with a charging rate limited by ρ+ > 0. In the second
stage, i.e. the ‘constant voltage’ (CV) stage, the effective charging rate levels off
exponentially towards the point where the SOC reaches the nominal maximum
capacity smax of the battery. The point of transition from the first stage to the
second is indicated by a SOC s∗ and an associated time t∗, which needs to be
specified for the respective battery. During both stages, we additionally consider
losses due to the specific charging efficiency η+ with 0 ≤ η+ ≤ 1. Additionally,
certain losses occur from the hybrid inverter (cf. Figure 1), modelled by ηinv with
0 ≤ ηinv ≤ 1. The hybrid inverter transforms the direct current from either the
battery or PV into alternating current at usable voltage and frequency for the
household appliances. It also works in the reverse direction to charge the battery.
To obtain an insight into how the households can make use of their battery
system, let us look at a specific example (cf. Figure 2(a)). Given a certain value
for the SOC, e.g. s′, we can associate a time t′, and thus specify a point on the
charging curve.
Within the next interval of length ∆t, the decision variable a+ of how much
to charge the battery will lie in H+ (s′) = {a+|h+ (s′, a+) ≤ 0}, with
h+
(
s′, a+
)
=
( −a+
a+ − φ+ (s′)
)
. (1)
In other words, a+ is limited by 0 < a+ ≤ φ+ (s′) < smax−s′. We use the notation
above to comply with the one shown in [9]. The upper limit φ+
(
s′
)
is described
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by the charging curve, as described above,
φ+
(
s′
)
=
{
ρ+∆t if CC charged
smaxγ1 exp
[
−∆tγ2
]
if CV charged
, (2)
where γ1, γ2 are defined such that the charging curve is smooth at the transition
point (t∗, s∗). The discrepancy between the grey–shaded area and the charging
curve in Figure 2(a) results from an imperfect charging efficiency. In fact, based
on the decision variable a+ the SOC of the battery changes according to the
charging transition equation
s
(
t′ +∆t
)
= s
(
t′
)
+ ηinv η
+a+ . (3)
Discharging and Self-Discharging: We model the discharging behaviour of lithium-
ion batteries by a linear decrease in the SOC. Here, the slope is given by the
discharging rate ρ− < 0. In order to account for the usual sharp drop off of the
discharging rate at low capacities, discharging is prohibited below a minimum SOC
smin. Again, we also consider losses due to the specific discharging efficiency η
−
with 0 ≤ η− ≤ 1 and the hybrid inverter.
In Figure 2(b) a specific example is given, to clarify how the user can discharge
its battery. Within the respective interval, the decision variable a− of how much
to discharge the battery will lie in H− (s′) = {a−|h− (s′, a−) ≤ 0}, with
h−
(
s′, a−
)
=
(
a−
−a− + φ− (s′)
)
. (4)
In other words, a− is limited by s′ − smin < φ−
(
s′
) ≤ a− < 0 and
φ−
(
s′
)
= ρ−∆t ηinv η
− . (5)
The dependency on s′ in (5) is implicitly given by the fact that we cannot go
lower than smin. Note that φ
− also depends on the efficiency parameter, such that
the actual amount taken from the battery in correspondence with the decision
variable a− (grey–shaded area in Figure 2(b)) is given by the discharging transition
equation
s
(
t′ +∆t
)
= s
(
t′
)
+
a−
ηinv η−
. (6)
In the following subsection, we will see that φ− is additionally limited by the
demand of the specific household, i.e. one can only discharge as much as is needed
to run all appliances.
Whenever the battery is neither charging nor discharging, it will be subject to
self-discharging. We model this type of behaviour with an exponential decline. This
case corresponds to the decision variable a = 0. The respective self-discharging
transition equation is given by
s
(
t′ +∆t
)
= s
(
t′
) · (1 + ρ¯)∆t (7)
where ρ¯ < 0 is the self-discharging rate.
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For later usage (cf. Section 3.1), we summarise the transition equations for
charging, discharging and self-discharging into a single transition equation f , i.e.
s(t+∆t) = f (s(t), a) =

s(t) + ηinv η
+a , a > 0
s(t) + a/(ηinv η−) , a < 0
s(t) · (1 + ρ¯)∆t , a = 0
. (8)
Furthermore, we combine the restrictions of the decision variable due to the battery
restrictions for charging and discharging, i.e.
h(s, a) =
(
a− φ+ (s)
−a+ φ− (s)
)
. (9)
2.2.2 PV Model
We model the solar panel as an additional source of electricity besides the grid
connection. The output of the nth household’s PV system during interval t is
denoted by wtn. It can serve two purposes: (i) direct usage by household appliances,
and (ii) charging the battery. Whereas direct usage is influenced by the efficiency
of the hybrid inverter, charging the battery does not require any inversion and
thus only depends on the charging efficiency of the battery.
An important parameter of the PV installation is the nominal kilowatt peak
kWp of the system. It is a measure of the size of the system and denotes the max-
imum output that can be expected under standardised conditions. A PV system
which operates at its maximum capacity, e.g. kWp = 3 kW, for one hour will pro-
duce 3 kWh. Note that identifying the optimal size of the PV installation does not
fall within the scope of this article. An approximated scale is obtained from [25,
11] (cf. Section 4.1).
2.2.3 Demand, Net-Demand and Load
We define the demand d¯tm ≥ 0 of a household m ∈M as the amount of electricity
that is needed to run all its appliances during the time interval t ∈ T . Thus, the
total daily demand-schedule can be written as d¯m =
(
d¯0m, . . . , d¯
T−1
m
)
. Throughout
the paper, we assume that the demand cannot be shifted. Thus our approach is
fully non-intrusive and does not influence the behaviour of the user.
Combining the demand d¯tn of a household n ∈ N with the generated electricity
wtn from the solar panel, gives the net-demand
dtn = d¯
t
n − ηinv wtn , (10)
where ηinv is the efficiency of the inverter (cf. Figure 1). Theoretically, this value
can be smaller than zero, i.e. when the effective generation is larger than the
demand in the specific interval. Practically, we ensure dtn ≥ 0 by storing all excess
energy directly in the battery. For households m 6∈ N , that do not participate in
the DSM scheme, the net-demand is identical to the demand.
Let ltm denote the load, i.e. the amount of energy drawn from the grid by
household m ∈M during interval t ∈ T . For households which do not participate
in the DSM scheme, the load equals their demand. For the others, the load depends
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on the decision atn taken at the specific interval. In other words, it combines the
net-energy demand with the amount of energy that is charged or discharged by
the battery
ltn = d
t
n + a
t
n , (11)
where max
{−dtn, φ−} ≤ atn ≤ φ+. The lower boundary expresses the fact that
one cannot discharge more than is actually needed to fulfil the net-demand, while
at the same time all battery restrictions remain valid. Due to this condition and
(10), we ensure that ltm ≥ 0 for all m ∈ M and all intervals t ∈ T . We write
lm =
(
l0m, . . . , l
T−1
m
)
for the schedule of loads of a specific household. Furthermore,
we can calculate the total load on the grid for interval t by
Lt =
∑
m∈M
ltm . (12)
Similarly, we define the average aggregated load of all households other than n
during time interval t by Lt−n = 1/(M−1)
∑
m∈M\n l
t
m .
2.2.4 Forecasting Errors
The DSM protocol states, that households send a forecast of their net-demand to
the UC. This depends on the demand as well as the electricity generated by the
solar panel. Both variables will introduce errors, that need to be accounted for. In
this paper, we consider the worst-case scenario. [1] gives a comprehensive overview
of current techniques for short term demand forecasting. They specifically investi-
gate how combining forecasts obtained from an integrated auto-regressive moving
average, an artificial neural network, and a similar day approach can improve the
short term load forecast. From [1], we obtain an upper limit for the forecasting
error d, expressed as a percentage of the actual demand. Similarly, [3] gives an
insight into 24 hour PV power output prediction. The forecasting error w is also
given as a percentage of the actual generation.
The worst-case scenario is constituted when these two errors carry opposing
signs and are correlated between all the participants. This becomes clear from (10),
since both contributions for the net-demand enter with different signs. Intuitively,
it makes sense that in the worst-case the forecasted net-demand is smaller than the
actual demand. This is because a too small forecasted net-demand does disguise
the incentive to make use of the battery system. With the same argument, the
worst-case solar forecast is higher than the actual one. It might imply a sufficient
SOC of the battery, when in reality more charging would have been necessary.
2.3 The Utility Company
Throughout the paper, we assume a single utility company (UC) serves all the
consumers in the neighbourhood. The UC runs a DSM scheme in order to reshape
the load profile. To be more precise, they want to achieve a flatter profile such that
investments into fast ramping technology, which is needed to deliver peak demand,
can be reduced. The incentive for the users to limit consumption during peak
hours is given by a dynamic pricing tariff: The cost per energy unit is calculated
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separately for each interval and depends on the aggregated load of all users in the
neighbourhood. Following [13,7,24,8], we employ a quadratic cost function gt:
gt(y) = c2 · y2 + c1 · y + c0 , t ∈ T , (13)
where y is the aggregated load at time t given by Lt and the coefficients c2 > 0,
c1 ≥ 0 and c0 ≥ 0. Similar to [13,20,7], we employ a proportional billing scheme,
where each participant of the DMS scheme pays for their share of the consumption,
i.e. the electricity bill Bn yields
Bn = −Ωn
∑
t∈T
gt ∀n ∈ N , (14)
with
Ωn =
∑
t l
t
n∑
t
∑
k l
t
k
. (15)
For households that do not participate in the DSM scheme, a standard fixed-
price tariff is employed, i.e.
Bm = p
∑
t
ltm ∀m ∈M \N . (16)
3 Dynamic Battery Scheduling Game
In this section, we formulate the non-cooperative dynamic game between the
households that possess individual energy storage and photovoltaic (PV) installa-
tions. To do so, we introduce the relevant notation and relate it to their respective
‘real-world’ meaning according to our system (cf. Section 2). Furthermore, the no-
tion of a Nash equilibrium (NE) is defined and an important result concerning the
link between the NE for the whole game and the NE for a subgame is provided.
Subsequently a dynamic programming algorithm is presented from which we de-
rive a closed form expression of the best response, i.e. the best decision a player
can make in response to fixed decisions of other players. Eventually we use this
result to construct an iterative algorithm that computes a NE of the game.
3.1 Definitions and Game Formulation
Formally, the game belongs to the category of discrete time dynamic games (cf. [9]),
where players make their decisions sequentially in stages. These stages directly
correspond to the daily intervals introduced in Section 2.1. For each stage we
define a state of the game, i.e. the current state-of-charge (SOC) of all batteries,
representing the configuration of the overall system. Furthermore, we define a
transition equation that models the evolution of this state based on the decisions
of the players. In other words, the players will choose actions that are directly
related to their battery usage, which in turn depends on the state of the game.
We consider a game with open-loop information structure, which means that the
initial state of the game is known by all players. In this game, players want to
minimise their energy bill, i.e. their utility function, which depends not only on
their own but also on the decisions of all other players. In a nutshell, we have:
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Definition 1 Our discrete time dynamic game with open-loop information struc-
ture consists of the following components:
(1) A set of players, i.e. participating households (cf. Section 2.1), N =
{1, 2, . . . , n, . . . , N}, where N denotes the number of players.
(2) A set of stages, i.e. intervals (cf. Section 2.1), T = {0, 1, . . . , t, . . . , T − 1},
where T denotes the number of stages and thus the number of decisions
a player can make in the game.
(3) Scalar state variables stn ∈ Sn ⊂ IR denoting the SOC of the nth player’s
battery at stage t ∈ T ∪{T}. Collectively, we denote the state variables of
all players at stage t by st :=
(
st1, s
t
2, . . . , s
t
N
) ∈ S := S1×S2×· · ·×SN ⊂
IRN . In the open-loop information structure it is assumed that the initial
state s0 is known2 to all players n ∈ N .
(4) Scalar decision variables atn ∈ Htn
(
stn
) ⊂ An ⊂ IR (for definition of Htn
see item (5)) denoting the usage of the battery of the nth player at time
t ∈ T . Collectively, we denote the decision variables of all players at stage t
by at :=
(
at1, a
t
2, . . . , a
t
N
) ∈ A := A1×A2×· · ·×AN ⊂ IRN . Furthermore
we define the schedule of battery usage of an individual player n ∈ N
as a collection of all its decisions in the stages of the game by an :=(
a0n, a
1
n, . . . , a
T−1
n
)
. A strategy profile is denoted by a := (a1, a2, . . . , aN ).
(5) A set of admissible decisions Hn
(
s0n
)
:=
{
an | htn
(
stn, a
t
n
) ≤ 0, t ∈ T } ⊂
IRT for the nth player. The function htn
(
stn, a
t
n
)
has been defined in (9)
Section 2.2.1, capturing the restrictions posed on the battery. We denote
Htn
(
stn
)
:=
{
atn | htn
(
stn, a
t
n
) ≤ 0} ⊂ IR
(6) A state transition equation
st+1n = f
t
n
(
stn, a
t
n
)
, t ∈ T , n ∈ N , (17)
governing the state variables
{
st
}T
t=0
. The function f tn
(
stn, a
t
n
)
is the dis-
cretised version of the transition equation (8) defined in Section 2.2.1,
showing how a decision of the player influences the state of its battery for
the upcoming stage.
2 Later we will see that the solutions/schedules require the players to deplete their battery
towards the end of the scheduling period (cf. finite horizon effect) to achieve maximum utility.
This means as long as none of the players deviates from their respective schedule this knowledge
is implicitly shared.
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(7) A stage additive utility function
Un
(
s0n, (an, a−n)
)
= −gTn
(
sTn
)
−
T−1∑
t=0
gtn
(
stn,
(
atn, a
t
−n
))
(18)
for the nth player, where a−n := (a1, a2, . . . , an−1, an+1, . . . , aN ) denotes
the decisions of all other players. The function gtn
(
stn,
(
atn, a
t
−n
))
has been
defined in (13) Section 2.3 capturing the costs to the nth player at the
tth stage. Note that the utility function depends only on the initial state
variable s0n, since the subsequent states s
t
n are determined by (17). The
function
gTn
(
sTn
)
= sTn (19)
expresses a penalty for the nth player that is incurred by ending up in
state sTn , i.e. its SOC, at the end of the scheduling period.
We represent the decision problem of the nth player as the following optimisation
problem:
Gn (a−n) given s0 ∈ S
maximise
an
Un
(
s0n, (an, a−n)
)
subject to atn ∈ Htn
(
stn
)
st+1n = f
t
n
(
stn, a
t
n
)
(20)
Moreover, the game is referred to as {G1, G2, . . . , GN}.
Definition 2 A strategy profile aˆ = (aˆ1, . . . , aˆN ) is a Nash equilibrium for the
game {G1, . . . , GN} if and only if for all players n ∈ N we have
Un
(
s0n, (aˆn, aˆ−n)
)
≥ Un
(
s0n, (an, aˆ−n)
)
, ∀an ∈ Hn
(
s0n
)
. (21)
3.2 Analysis of the Game
In order to analyse the game {G1, . . . , GN}, we follow the dynamic programming
(DP) idea by Nie et al. [9]. To do so, we introduce notation for subproblems of
(20). Furthermore, we show an important result about Nash equilibria for these
subproblems, which constitutes the basis for the DP-algorithm. Applying the gen-
eral algorithm eventually leads us to an analytic formulation of the nth player’s
best response aˆn, given the strategies a−n of other players at stage t of a T -stage
game.
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3.2.1 Subgame Formulation
For subproblems that are only interested in decisions taken from stage t′ onwards,
we write:
st
′,T−1
n :=
(
st
′
n , . . . , s
T−1
n
)
, st
′,T−1 :=
(
st
′
, . . . , sT−1
)
at
′,T−1
n :=
(
at
′
n , . . . , a
T−1
n
)
, at
′,T−1 :=
(
at
′
, . . . , aT−1
)
UT−t
′
n
(
st
′
n ,
(
at
′,T−1
n , a
t′,T−1
−n
))
= −gTn
(
sTn
)
−
T−1∑
τ=t′
gτn (s
τ
n, (a
τ
n, a
τ
−n))
Ht′,T−1n
(
st
′
n
)
:=
{
at
′,T−1
n | hτn (sτn, aτn) ≤ 0, τ = t′, t′ + 1, . . . , T − 1
}
.
For t′ ∈ T we define a subproblem of the nth player as the following optimisation
problem:
GT−t
′
n
(
at
′,T−1
−n
)
given st
′ ∈ S
maximise
an
UT−t
′
n
(
st
′
n ,
(
at
′,T−1
n , a
t′,T−1
−n
))
subject to at
′,T−1
n ∈ Ht
′,T−1
n
(
st
′
n
)
st
′+1
n = f
t′
n
(
st
′
n , a
t′
n
)
(22)
Therefore, the subgame is referred to as
{
GT−t
′
1 , G
T−t′
2 , . . . , G
T−t′
N
}
.
Theorem 1 Let aˆ =
(
aˆ0, . . . , aˆT−1
)
constitute a Nash equilibrium for the game
{G1, . . . , GN} with the corresponding trajectories of states sˆ =
(
sˆ0, . . . , sˆT
)
. Con-
sider the subgame
{
GT−t1 , . . . , G
T−t
N
}
for each t ∈ T . Then, the truncated strat-
egy aˆt,T−1 =
(
aˆt, aˆt+1, . . . , aˆT−1
)
comprises a Nash equilibrium for the subgame{
GT−t1 , . . . , G
T−t
N
}
.
Proof The proof can be found in the Appendix A.1. uunionsq
3.2.2 The DP-Algorithm and Derivation of the Best Response Solution
Based on the results of the previous subsection, we can formulate the following
DP-algorithm to find the solution to the decision problem Gn(a−n) (20), i.e. the
optimal decision for the nth player given the decisions a−n of the other players.
Let us apply Algorithm 1 to obtain the result to the decision problem Gn(a−n)
(20) in closed form. Note that both for-loops (line 1 and line 3) are treated im-
plicitly by keeping sT and st unspecified throughout the computations.
Given the total scheduling length T , the aggregated decisions a−n of all other
players, and the initial SOC s0 of the batteries, at the first step (t = T ) we set
V 0n (s
T
n ) = s
T
n according to (19). With this we enter the while-loop (line 2) which
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Algorithm 1: DP algorithm for player n ∈ N to find the solution to (20).
Input: T , a−n, s0
t← T
1 for each sT ∈ S do
V 0n (s
T
n )← gTn
(
sTn
)
2 while t > 0 do
t← t− 1
3 for each st ∈ S do
aˆtn ← argmax
atn∈Htn(stn)
−gtn
(
stn,
(
atn, a
t
−n
))− V T−t−1n (ft (stn, atn))
V T−tn (s
t
n)← max
atn∈Htn(stn)
−gtn
(
stn,
(
atn, a
t
−n
))− V T−t−1n (ft (stn, atn))
end
end
end
Output: aˆn
overwrites t to now represent t = T − 1. We solve for the best decision aˆT−1n by
solving the following problem
aˆT−1n = argmax
aT−1n
gT−1n︷ ︸︸ ︷
−c2
(
dT−1n + a
T−1
n + L
T−1
−n
)2 − c1 (dT−1n + aT−1n + LT−1−n )− c0
− sT−1n − aT−1n︸ ︷︷ ︸
V 0n
where we made use of the transition equation (17) to rewrite V 0n . The solution is
computed as
aˆT−1n = −sT−1n ,
and subsequently we have
V 1n = c2
(
dT−1n − sT−1n + LT−1−n
)2
+ c1
(
dT−1n − sT−1n + LT−1−n
)
+ c0 .
With this, the first step is done and we again overwrite t to now represent t = T−2.
In this stage we solve the following problem
aˆT−2n = argmax
aT−2n
− gT−2n
(
sT−2n ,
(
aT−2n , a
T−2
−n
))
− c2
(
dT−1n −
[
sT−2n + a
T−2
n
]
+ LT−1−n
)2
− c1
(
dT−1n −
[
sT−2n + a
T−2
n
]
+ LT−1−n
)
− c0 .
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The solution is computed as
aˆT−2n =
1
2
(
dT−1n − dT−2n − sT−2n + LT−1−n − LT−2−n
)
,
from which we obtain
V 2n =
c2
2
(
dT−1n − dT−2n − sT−2n + LT−1−n − LT−2−n
)2
+ c1
(
dT−1n − dT−2n − sT−2n + LT−1−n − LT−2−n
)
+ 2c0 ,
finalising the second step. This procedure can be done for all subsequent steps. As
the equations increase quickly in size, they become infeasible to quote here. For-
tunately though, our calculations provided insight into recurring patterns, which
all the solutions seem to follow. Eventually, the solution for an arbitrary stage t
of the T -stage dynamic game can be written as
aˆtn =
1
T − t
[
T−1∑
τ=t+1
(dτn + L
τ
−n)− stn − (T − t− 1)
(
dtn + L
t
−n
)]
(23)
Note that during the derivation the non-linear battery constraints are not strictly
considered. Similar to the forecasting errors (cf. Section 3.3), these are considered
in our simulation when the equilibrium schedules are actually executed.
3.3 The Algorithm and Execution of NE schedules
Similar to [13], we make use of a best-response algorithm (cf. Algorithm 2) to
find the solution to the game. Whereas in [13] an extensive search for optimal
Algorithm 2: Best-response algorithm for finding a pure NE based on [19]
Input: T , s0
initialise random strategy profile a = (an, a−n)
1 while there exists a player n for whom an is not a best response to a−n do
2 for each n ∈ N do
3 for each t ∈ T do
aˆtn ← best response to a−n based on (23)
end
an ←
(
aˆ0n, . . . , aˆ
T−1
n
)
end
end
Output: aˆ
schedules aˆn was performed, here we can compute the best response for each stage
(line 3) analytically by means of (23) and concatenate the results to obtain the
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optimal schedule aˆn in response to a−n. Performing this computation for each
player n ∈ N (line 2) results in a new strategy profile a. We iterate this (line 1)
as long as “there exists a player n for whom an is not a best response to a−n”. In
the actual implementation, this check is done by comparing the current strategy
profile with the one obtained from the previous iteration. If it did not change, up
to machine precision, an equilibrium is reached and aˆ = (aˆn, aˆ−n) constitutes the
Nash equilibrium.
Based on the definition of a NE, no household can benefit from unilaterally
deviating from its respective schedule. Nonetheless, we have to keep in mind that
it is based on forecasted demand and renewable generation. Whenever either the
demand or the generation does not match the forecasted value, it might not be pos-
sible anymore to strictly follow this NE schedule. In the analysis in the subsequent
sections, we assume that every individual always seeks to be as close as possible
to their determined NE schedule. To illustrate the idea: Imagine a NE schedule of
household n requires them to discharge an amount x in a certain interval. Due to a
forecasting error for the renewable generation, this has not been charged fully and
can thus not be delivered. In this case, the schedule will discharge as much as pos-
sible during this interval. The deviation from the NE will decrease the benefit in
terms of PAR reductions and achieved savings for the consumer. Anticipating the
results, we want to highlight that in the following section we show that the solution
is robust with respect to these deviations and gives considerable improvements in
comparison to other approaches in the literature.
4 Results and Discussion
In this section, we firstly summarise important simulation parameters and intro-
duce the specific datasets for electricity demand and generation from the pho-
tovoltaic (PV) installation. After analysing the convergence behaviour of the
iteration algorithm, we compare the game–theoretic approach introduced in this
manuscript (cf. Section 3.1) with a simpler non-cooperative static game, reveal-
ing the advantages of the dynamic treatment. Subsequently, the analysis of how
the participation rate of the DSM scheme and the forecasting errors influence the
scheduling outcome is shown. Finally, we consider the influence of the composition
of the neighbourhood on the peak-to-average ratio (PAR) reduction. This is an
important measurement of the effectiveness of the DSM scheme. We consider the
PAR of the aggregated electricity load (12) over the respective scheduling period.
It is defined by
PAR = T · maxt∈T L
t∑
t∈T Lt
. (24)
4.1 The Simulation Setup
In the real-world application, the smart meter of individual households collects
data about electricity demand and generation from the available PV installation.
As specified in Section 2.1, the demand-side management (DSM) protocol requires
participants to send forecasts of the demand and generation to the utility com-
pany. These forecasts are based on historically collected data. In order to run our
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simulations, we omit this forecasting step and rather make use of two publicly
available data sets.
Demand data: The demand data stem from the openei dataset [23]. It contains 365
days of simulated hourly data3 for households in TMY3-locations in the USA [10].
The building models used for this simulation can be found in [22]. Based on an
additional survey, all buildings are put into one of three different categories. They
differ with respect to their overall consumption. Following [23], we refer to them
as LOW, BASE and HIGH consumers. For all simulation runs, we picked the same
M = 25 households, in close vicinity to each other, to represent our neighbourhood.
With respect to their consumption categories, we have seven LOW, nine BASE
and nine HIGH users.
PV data: Data for the PV generation are based on real-world measurements [15] in
the UK. They contain hourly values for days between September 2013 and October
2014. Note that latitude and climate zone of the measurement location are similar
to the ones of the demand data. Under the assumption that the weather for all
households in the neighbourhood is the same, we use data from the same site for
each of them. An estimate for the kWp value is obtained from looking at the highest
hourly output in the course of a whole year. Its value is wmax = 3.7 kWh, which is
why we assume kWp ≈ 4 kW. We account for different sizes of PV installations by
scaling the data set with a household specific factor pn. About 6% of the collected
data was corrupted. We set all these values to w = 0.0 kWh. This does not pose
any problem for our simulation results, but can be seen as realistic failures of the
installation.
Battery and pricing parameters: The parameters of the battery are based on the
Tesla Powerwall 2 [21] data sheet. The choice to employ this battery system is
motivated by two reasons: (i) The same battery was used in [13], allowing for a
direct comparison of the results. (ii) A non-extensive analysis of different battery
systems showed that the Tesla Powerwall 2 qualifies as a representative of state-
of-the-art technology. Please see the Appendix A.2 for more details. A summary
of the battery parameters can be found in Table 1. The data sheet only specifies
the round-trip efficiency η = η+ · η− of the battery. Without loss of generality,
we assume that charging and discharging contribute equally, yielding η+ = η− =√
0.918.
For the parameters in the cost function (13) we use c2 = 0.03125 $/MW
2,
c1 = 1.0 $/MW, and c0 = 0, following other studies [13,16]. This allows to directly
compare our results.
4.2 Convergence Behaviour of the Algorithm
Let us provide an insight into the convergence behaviour of Algorithm 2. The
condition that needs to be fulfilled to declare equilibrium is stated as ‘there exists
no player n for whom his current action an is not a best response to the actions a−n
of the other players’ (cf. Algorithm 2, line 1). Within our specific implementation
3 We make use of T = 24 for all simulations, if not stated otherwise.
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Table 1 Battery parameters. Parameters for a Tesla-inspired [21] home battery storage sys-
tem.
Variable Value
η+ 0.958
η− 0.958
ηinv 0.960
ρ+ 5.0 kW/h
ρ− −7.0 kW/h
ρ¯ −0.001
smax 13.5 kWh
smin 0.0 kWh
s∗ 9.46 kWh
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17
#iteration
10-12
10-9
10-6
10-3
100
|"
 
B|
decrease
increase
Fig. 3 Convergence analysis of Algorithm 2. The change of the average bill of the DSM
participants between consecutive iterations is plotted over the iteration number. The ordinate
is scaled logarithmically. Bars are coloured according to the algebraic sign of the change. The
specific data points stem from a simulation in Section 4.4 with 64% participation rate and
without forecasting errors.
of selma, the stopping criteria is based on the L2 difference between the action
profiles of two consecutive iterations, i.e. when this difference is smaller or equal
to 10−15 the algorithm breaks out of the loop. Associated with the current action
profile during each iteration are also the energy bills for each participant.
Results: In Figure 3, the absolute change of the average bill B = 1/N
∑
nBn
(cf. (14)) is shown for a randomly selected day of the simulation shown in Sec-
tion 4.4. To cover the large scale of different changes, a logarithmic representation
is chosen. The respective sign of the change is then expressed in the colour of the
bar.
Figure 4 shows how the number of average iterations per day depends on the
number of participants in the DSM scheme. The values are again taken from the
simulations in Section 4.4.
Discussion: The results give evidence of a correctly working iteration algorithm
(cf. Algorithm 2). From Figure 3 we see that between any two consecutive itera-
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Fig. 4 Iteration statistics. The mean number of iterations per day is plotted over the partic-
ipation rate in per cent. The values stem from the simulations undertaken in Section 4.4. In
addition to the average over 365 days, the standard deviation is shown for each data point.
tions, the absolute change of the average electricity bill is monotonically decreas-
ing. Furthermore, we observe that the rate of this decrease is almost linear in the
semi-logarithmic plot, hinting towards an exponential relationship.
Due to the exponential convergence towards a Nash equilibrium, only few it-
erations are needed to obtain the equilibrium schedules. The specific number of
iterations depends on the number of participants taking part in the DSM scheme.
This is comparable to the ones shown in [8]. Figure 4 shows that the average
number of iterations increases monotonically with the number of participants.
Moreover, the variation across the number of iterations for individual scheduling
periods is small, as shown by the standard deviation. This is a strong result, as it
shows that the convergence properties are insensitive to different demand data of
the individual participants. During experimentations with the code, more than
one million games were solved which all converged to a Nash equilibrium.
The small number of iterations directly translates to small computational times
and thus does not hinder a real-world application. Typical 365-day simulation runs
take about 30 s on a single core of an i7-3770S CPU and require less than 1 GB of
memory. Note that in the real-life scenario, the scheduling process is initiated once
before the scheduling period and only needs to calculate the equilibrium schedules
for the upcoming day. In summary, we expect no difficulties in implementing a
DSM scheme based on our scheduling software selma.
4.3 Comparison Between a Static and a Dynamic DSM scheme
In [13], a similar DSM scheme to the one described in Section 2.1 was examined.
Both are based on a battery scheduling game for households of a neighbourhood
served by the same utility company (UC). Their main difference is the underly-
ing game that determines the schedules for the upcoming day. Whereas in this
paper we employ a discrete time dynamic game, [13] made use of a simpler non-
cooperative static game in which players were only able to choose between four
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Fig. 5 Load comparison. The aggregated load of all households in the neighbourhood is plotted
over time. The simulation domains cover seven days, that were each scheduled consecutively.
The aggregated demand is given as a reference. The orange curve results from a DSM scheme
employing a static scheduling game [13], while the green one stems from a DSM scheme employ-
ing a dynamic game. Other than the underlying game structure, all parameters are identical.
Table 2 PAR comparison. Peak-to-average ratios calculated as the average over the individual
days of week 12, week 25, week 38, and week 51 for the case without storage system (Reference)
and both underlying games of the DSM scheme. µ gives the average over all four weeks. Static:
game employed in [13]; Dynamic: game described in Section 3.1. The values in parentheses
represent the standard deviation.
Reference Static Dynamic
Period
week 12 1.623 (0.005) 1.374 (0.070) 1.013 (<0.001)
week 25 1.574 (0.033) 1.410 (0.035) 1.198 (0.016)
week 38 1.685 (0.031) 1.439 (0.080) 1.231 (0.015)
week 51 1.718 (0.037) 1.468 (0.082) 1.015 (0.001)
µ 1.650 (0.064) 1.423 (0.040) 1.114 (0.117)
discrete options for each interval. For a more thorough description please see [13].
For the sake of comparison, none of the households is equipped with PV cells.
In this subsection, we compare the two approaches with respect to their success
in reducing the PAR of the aggregated load. To this end, the same parameters for
each household and also the same demand data are used. Households do not have
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(a) static scheduling game (b) dynamic scheduling game
Fig. 6 Nash equilibrium schedule comparison. The schedules for all participating households
of the demand-side management scheme for a single scheduling period (week 38, day 5, cf. [13])
are shown together with their respective aggregated load and aggregated state-of-charge (SOC).
(a) The underlying game structure is a static non-cooperative game from [13]. Within each
interval, players can choose between four discrete decisions. (b) Here, the game structure is
the dynamic game introduced in Section 3.1. Note that the schedules employ the same scaling.
the capability of on-site generation, but are equipped with the same batteries
(cf. Table 1). The upcoming day is divided into T = 12 intervals and we assume
N = M = 25, i.e. every household takes part in the DSM scheme. As in [13], we
simulate full weeks by using the state-of-charge (SOC) values of the batteries at
the end of the scheduling period as the initial configuration for the following one.
Results: Figure 5(a) and Figure 5(b) show the aggregated load curves achieved by
the DSM schemes for forecasts given by week 12 and week 38 of the demand data
set [23], respectively. For completion, we also simulated week 25 and week 51 as
done in [13]. A summary of the achieved results can be seen in Table 2.
On average, a 14% and a 32% decrease of the PAR value was achieved by the
static and the dynamic games, respectively. To understand the differences of the
outcomes, we explicitly look at the schedules that are obtained in the NE of the
respective games. Figure 6 shows these schedules exemplarily for day 5 of week 38
(Figure 5(b), cf. Figure 3 in [13]) together with the aggregated load and aggregated
SOC above it. Each row illustrates the equilibrium schedule of one household.
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Discussion: Comparing the aggregated load curves (cf. Figure 5) shows that a
DSM scheme based on a dynamic game can achieve an almost flat profile. Nev-
ertheless, depending on the given data, the outcome of the scheduling is subject
to a finite-horizon effect. Empirically, we observe peaks and troughs at the end of
the scheduling period if the demand for the final interval is lower than the aver-
age demand of the whole day. This indicates that the starting time of the DSM
scheme has an influence on the achievable outcome. Nonetheless, this parameter
is fixed through the DSM scheme protocol, thus asking for alternative solutions
to the finite-horizon effect. Future work will aim to eliminate the influence of the
starting time altogether.
In Table 2, we observe that on average the dynamic game reduces the PAR
value more than twice as much as the static game. However, with respect to the
individual weeks the static game shows a smaller standard deviation of 0.04 and
thus seems to be more consistent. Its achieved reductions are all between 10.4% –
15.3%, while the range of reductions by the DMS scheme with the dynamic game
is 23.9% – 40.9%. The differences with respect to the standard deviations is again
owed to the finite-horizon effect. It is also present in the case with the static game,
but due to generally worse outcome, does not alter it as much as the results of the
dynamic scheduling game.
We can further understand the differences between the static and dynamic
game from Figure 6. The restriction to four discrete options for each interval in
the static case, i.e. (i) remain idle, (ii) charge half interval, (iii) charge full interval,
and (iv) use battery, results in a majority of intervals where the battery remains
idle. This is because of a lack of incentive to charge the battery by the two given
amounts. In the dynamic game, players can choose to charge their battery from
a continuous spectrum of decisions in a given interval. This difference becomes
most apparent when looking at the aggregated SOC of all participants. Whereas
the maximal SOC in the static case is approximately 64 kWh, almost twice as
much (120 kWh) is charged in the dynamic case. In summary, it shows that the
increased flexibility of the dynamic game is better suited to minimise the PAR of
the aggregated load.
Note that all these comparisons allow for strong conclusions as they are based
on the identical data set [23] and also all the other parameters, such as number of
players N , number of time intervals T , etc. are chosen to be the same. Nevertheless,
comparisons to other results in the literature are possible: Compared to the work
by Nguyen et al. [8], a better PAR reduction is achieved while also the number of
iterations to obtain the equilibrium solution is lower by two orders of magnitude.
Similarly, the PAR reduction of Yaagoubi et al. [24] is worse than the approach
shown in this manuscript. As they schedule not only the battery but also shift other
household appliances, a comparison of the computational costs is not appropriate.
4.4 Influence of Participation Rate and Forecasting Errors
The question of how many participants are needed to obtain considerable gains
in terms of PAR reduction and savings is important. Moreover, within this sub-
section the robustness with respect to the forecasting errors (cf. Section 2.2.4) is
shown. To do so, we assume the forecasting error for the demand to be d = 8%
for every household [1], which could be obtained from a forecast performed by an
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Fig. 7 Peak-to-average ratio (PAR) reduction dependency on the participation rate. The mean
PAR reduction in per cent is plotted over the participation rate in per cent. The right-hand
axis shows the absolute values of the PAR. In addition to the average over 365 days, the
standard deviation is shown for each data point. The simulations were run for a scenario with
forecasting errors and one without forecasting errors. Note that the data points are slightly
shifted along the abscissa to increase readability.
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Fig. 8 Savings dependency on the participation rate. The mean bill reduction in per cent for
participants of the demand-side management scheme are plotted over the participation rate
in per cent. In addition to the average over 365 days and participants, the standard deviation
between different participants is shown for each data point. The simulations were run for a
scenario with forecasting errors and one without forecasting errors. The difference between the
two curves is plotted against the right-hand axis.
artificial neural network, and is approximately 2.5 times higher than the best fore-
cast obtained by them. This is independent of whether the household participates
in the DSM scheme or not. The forecasting error for the solar generation is set to
w = 10% in accordance with [3,17]. Rana et al. [17] make use of a neural network
and clustering of weather data to forecast half hourly solar power output for the
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upcoming day. Note that only participants of the DSM scheme are equipped with
PV cells and thus subject to the forecasting error. The values are taken to repre-
sent a worst-case scenario. Subsequently, any real-world scheduling result should
fall in the interval between the worst-case outcome and the respective outcome
without any forecasting error.
We simulate a full year and average over the obtained PAR values for the indi-
vidual days. All participants are equipped with a lithium-ion battery (cf. Table 1)
and a solar cell. The size of the PV installation depends on the user’s category.
For LOW, BASE, and HIGH consumers, we use pn = 0.3, pn = 0.5, and pn = 0.7,
respectively. Starting with all 25 households taking part in the DSM scheme, we
eliminated three users, i.e. one randomly selected from each consumer category, in
each subsequent run. Non-participant still exhibit the specified forecasting error
for their demand.
Results: Figure 7 shows the reduction of the PAR value over the rate of partici-
pating consumers for the scenarios with and without forecasting errors. It includes
not only the mean values, but also the standard deviation. Note that we slightly
shifted the results for both runs along the abscissa to increase readability. An
additional axis on the left indicates the absolute PAR values. Whereas the PAR
reduction is the interest of the UC, the financial rewards, i.e. savings off the en-
ergy bill, are the interests of the participants of the DSM scheme. Figure 8 shows
the average saving per day for all participants both with and without forecasting
error. For further insight, it also illustrates the difference between the two curves.
Discussion: Although a worst-case scenario is simulated, the outcome with respect
to PAR reduction (cf. Figure 7) and electricity bill (cf. Figure 8) reduction show
considerable gains for the UC and the participants of the DSM scheme.
Without forecasting error the PAR reduction monotonically improves with the
proportion of the participants. This stands in contrast to the results shown in [20],
where a minimum is reached at medium range participation rate. In comparison to
other studies, such as [8,5], we conclude that our dynamic game performs as good
as their respective scheduling approach. At 100% participation rate, a reduction
of −33.3% (5.8%) is achieved, in agreement with the results shown in Section 4.3.
It should be noted that a perfectly flat load profile corresponds to an approxi-
mately −40% reduction of the PAR. Thus the outcome is close to the theoretical
optimum. When looking at the standard deviation, we observe that it is lowest for
the simulation run with 52% participation rate and increases towards both ends of
the spectrum. On the lower end of participation rate the fluctuations of the PAR
value for different days is just an artefact of the data set in use. Small numbers
of participants have not enough influence on the overall neighbourhood to change
this. When regarding large participation rates, the PAR value is considerably re-
duced. The increase of the standard variation for these runs stem directly from
the finite-horizon effect already discussed in Section 4.3.
The results for runs with forecasting errors follow the results without errors
closely. Figure 9 shows how the forecasting error affects the achieved PAR values
for three selected participation rates when transitioning from the perfect forecast
to the worst-case scenario as depicted in Figure 7. For low participation rates the
difference is negligible but starts to increase when more households participate
in the DSM scheme. Nevertheless, even in the worst-case scenario, a reduction
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Fig. 9 Influence of forecasting error on the achieved PAR value. The PAR values for three
different participation rates are plotted over the forecasting error. Here the abscissa refers to
the worst-case scenario as described in Section 4.4, e.g. at 0.6 a forecasting error with the
magnitude of 60% of the worst-case is assumed. In the reference case no game is played, so
the forecasting error does not influence the PAR value.
of −27.8% (8.9%) is achieved at 100% participation rate (cf. Figure 7). With
respect to the standard deviation, we again recognise similarities to the runs with-
out forecasting errors. Smallest variations in the PAR reduction are obtained for
participation rates around 50%, while we again see increasing variations at high
participation rates. Here, the increase is distinctly larger than in the other runs.
The reason behind this difference is directly explained by the forecasting error. As
more participants join the DSM scheme, the absolute amount of deviation from
the actual demand and production is increasing.
It is worth noting that the result for a participation rate of 76%, i.e. a reduction
of −27.7% (4.4%) (cf. Figure 7), are very promising from a practical point of view.
The UC might not be able to convince everybody to participate in the DSM
scheme, but can still gain reductions of the PAR value close to what is achievable
at maximum participation.
In [14] it is investigated what happens when no forecast is calculated. Rather
than calculating the forecast, the demand data of the current day is used as the
input to the dynamic game that determines the schedules for the next day. It turns
out that this approach is oversimplified and results in distinctly worse outcomes
(cf. [14, Figure 5]), i.e. it shows the importance of a suitable forecasting mechanism.
The savings that participants of the DSM scheme can gain increase monoton-
ically with the share of participants. Furthermore, we observe that the variations
between different participants is negligible. This is due to the particular propor-
tional billing scheme employed in the scheme (cf. Section 2.3). It ensures fairness
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in the sense that LOW and HIGH consumers can gain equally by signing up for
the DSM scheme. The difference between runs with and without forecasting er-
rors reveals that the forecasting error does not influence the bill reduction to a
great extent. Since the two curves are almost non-separable to the unaided eye,
the difference is shown in the same plot (cf. Figure 8). It becomes clear that the
difference is actually decreasing for larger numbers of participants.
This highlights that the dynamic scheduling game ensures robust and beneficial
results for the participants of the DSM scheme, even in the worst-case scenario.
4.5 Consumer Type Dependency
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Fig. 10 Peak-to-average ratio (PAR) reduction for different neighbourhoods. The mean PAR
reduction in per cent is plotted over the participation rate in per cent for different mono-type
consumer neighbourhoods. In addition to the average over 365 days, the standard deviation is
shown for each data point. For comparison, the results of a mixed neighbourhood (cf. Figure 7)
are also presented. Note that the data points are slightly shifted along the abscissa to increase
readability.
Results: The results in Section 4.3 and Section 4.4 are all based on a neighbour-
hood consisting of a mix of the three different consumer types (LOW, BASE,
HIGH). Figure 10 shows the possible PAR reductions for mono-type neighbour-
hoods. To allow for comparison M = 25 is kept constant. Furthermore, we use the
same forecasting errors of d = 8% and w = 10% for the demand and renewable
energy generation, respectively (cf. Section 4.4). All the simulations consider a
scheduling period of a full year.
We also calculated the average savings that are achieved by the participants
of the DSM scheme. These results are presented in Figure 11 together with the
reference of a mixed neighbourhood (cf. Figure 8) with forecasting errors.
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Fig. 11 Savings for different neighbourhoods. The mean bill reduction in per cent for par-
ticipants of the demand-side management scheme are plotted over the participation rate in
per cent for different mono-type consumer neighbourhoods. In addition to the average over
365 days and participants, the standard deviation between different participants is shown for
each data point. For comparison, the results of a mixed neighbourhood (cf. Figure 8) are also
presented.
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Fig. 12 Differences between neighbourhoods in peak-to-average ratio (PAR) reduction. The
values shown are based on the results represented in Figure 10.
Discussion: When comparing different compositions of neighbourhoods, we can
gain further insight into the conditions for which the DSM scheme works most effi-
ciently. At first glance, Figure 10 reveals that given a low rate of participants in the
scheme, the actual type of consumer is not crucial. Figure 12 shows the difference
between the respective results for mono-type neighbourhoods and a mixed neigh-
bourhood. A closer look shows that mono-LOW communities are always worse in
reducing the PAR value of the aggregated load than any of the other ones. The
results in terms of both the mean PAR reduction and the standard deviation get
even worse with more than two thirds of households participating in the scheme.
Similar observations for mono-type neighbourhoods are found in [20].
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For both mono-BASE and mono-HIGH neighbourhoods it can be observed
that they perform better (< 1%) in an interval of medium participation rate than
the mixed neighbourhood. Nevertheless, at N = M the obtained PAR reduction
is smaller by 1.8% and 4.5%, respectively. Considering the variation of these mean
PAR reduction values, it becomes clear that it is most beneficial to have a mixed-
consumer neighbourhood.
Figure 11 shows the average bill reduction for the participants of the DSM
scheme for different participation rates. Generally, they show the same behaviour
already observed in Figure 8. The influence of the proportionality factor in the
billing scheme (14) is clearly visible. Although the mixed-consumer neighbourhood
achieves better PAR reduction, the average savings are almost identical to a mono-
BASE neighbourhood. A neighbourhood that purely consists of HIGH consumers
can save about 11% off the energy bill and is consistently most rewarding for the
participants independent of the participation rate.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a demand-side management (DSM) scheme based on
a discrete time dynamic game. Its purpose is to reduce the peak-to-average ratio
(PAR) of the aggregated electricity load by scheduling the usage of individually
owned (lithium-ion) energy storage systems. The utility company running the
scheme, incentivises users to take part by offering fair financial benefits. To en-
sure realistic outcomes, an advanced battery model is employed. Furthermore, the
integration of local energy generation in form of photovoltaic cells is taken into
account.
The DSM scheme is suitable for real-world implementation for four reasons:
Firstly, it is based on a complete model of the neighbourhood including storage
systems, local energy generation, and crucially forecasting errors of both demand
and generation. Secondly, computational costs to obtain schedules for the upcom-
ing period are small and require only little amounts of memory. This was achieved
by deriving a closed form solution for the best-response problem of an individual
player. The ensuing iterative algorithm seems to converge exponentially towards a
Nash-equilibrium and thus obtains the strategy profiles for one scheduling period
in a fraction of a second. Thirdly, the resulting schedules are robust with respect
to the worst-case forecasting errors. Whereas the error weakens the effect of the
PAR reduction by ≤ 5.5%, the corresponding savings off the energy bill for the
participants of the scheme are hardly changed. Fourthly, we provide evidence that
a neighbourhood that consists of various types of consumers performs best in such
a DSM scheme. Since a mixed community is more probable than a mono-type
community, this is a promising result.
A direct and in-depth comparison to a DSM scheme with an underlying static
game, revealed the advantages of the dynamic game approach. Players are overall
more active and thus able to achieve distinctly better results. Further comparisons
with the literature in terms of PAR reduction and computational costs show the
superiority of our approach.
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Future Work: In future work, we plan to corroborate our results with an even
more sophisticated approach to treat the uncertainties caused by the forecasts of
demand and renewable energy generation. There are two main approaches that
can be considered: (i) Robust (finite) game theory, which can be seen as a gener-
alised version of a Bayesian game. (ii) A two step approach that first determines
day-ahead schedules and then refines them throughout the day by using most
recent data. The latter might be realised in a sliding window framework which
would potentially eliminate the finite-horizon effects that can be encountered in
our solutions. Furthermore, one could also think about modelling risks associated
with the uncertainties directly in the utility function by means of the conditional
value-at-risk measurement.
Whereas the current approach investigates a rather small community of house-
holds, it is worth to also explore the other end of the spectrum when the number
of players becomes large. The method of choice here is mean field game theory in
which the behaviour of the system is examined in the limit of an infinite number
of players.
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APPENDIX
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
We prove the theorem by contradiction. Suppose aˆt,T−1 is not a Nash equilibrium
to the subgame
{
GT−t1 , . . . , G
T−t
N
}
. Then, for some n ∈ N , there must exist
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another strategy a¯t,T−1n with the corresponding sequence of states {s¯τn}Tτ=t such
that
UT−tn
((
s¯tn, sˆ
t
−n
)
,
(
a¯t,T−1n , aˆ
t,T−1
−n
))
> UT−tn
(
sˆt, aˆt,T−1
)
Therefore, we obtain
Un
(
s0n,
(
aˆ0,t−1,
(
a¯t,T−1n , aˆ
t,T−1
−n
)))
= UT−tn
((
s¯tn, sˆ
t
−n
)
,
(
a¯t,T−1n , aˆ
t,T−1
−n
))
−
t−1∑
τ=0
gτn (sˆ
τ
n, (aˆ
τ
n, aˆ
τ
−n))
> UT−tn
(
sˆt, aˆt,T−1
)
−
t−1∑
τ=0
gτn (sˆ
τ
n, (aˆ
τ
n, aˆ
τ
−n))
= Un
(
sˆ0, aˆ0,T−1
)
= Un
(
sˆ0, aˆ
)
That is in contradiction to our assumption that aˆ is a Nash equilibrium for
the game {G1, . . . , GN}. Consequently, our assumption about aˆt,T−1 is proved
to be false. Thus aˆt,T−1 indeed comprises a Nash equilibrium of the subgame{
GT−t1 , . . . , G
T−t
N
}
. uunionsq
A.2 Battery Justification
Various companies produce home energy storage systems. To name just a few there
are Mercedes, Tesla, BMW, Nissan and Powervault. Some of them are specialised
in second life batteries taken from their electric cars, while others (such as Tesla)
produce these batteries for their special purpose. As most manufacturers provide
technical data sheets, we were able to run our simulations for the demand-side
management scheme assuming that households are equipped with different bat-
teries. The results in Figure 13 stem from scenarios with 76% participation rate,
forecasting errors as used in Section 4.4, and all participants with the exact same
battery model. This is not supposed to compare different systems, but rather to
show, that this battery (also employed in [13]) can be taken as a representative of
state-of-the-art technology. In this particular simulation run, it achieves a peak-
to-average ratio reduction similar to the best in the field. Also the savings off the
energy bill are close to the best competitors.
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Fig. 13 Battery Justification. The mean peak-to-average ratio reduction of the aggregated
load over 365 days is plotted over the mean savings off the electricity bill for participants of
the demand-side management scheme with different battery systems. For all runs we assumed
N/M = 76%, d = 8%, w = 10%, and the same pricing parameter as introduced in Section ??.
A close-up of the bottom left-hand corner is shown in a subplot. For all data points, we also
provide the standard deviation in both variables.
